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Precautionary Reason as a Link to Moral Action 
 
Deryck Beyleveld* and Shaun Pattinson** 
 
[2000. “Precautionary Reasoning as a Link to Moral Action.” In Michael Boylan ed., 
Medical Ethics, 39–53. Upper Saddle River New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2000.] 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
In Reason and Morality (1978), Alan Gewirth demonstrates2 that agents and prospective 
agents3 deny that they are agents if they do not accept and act in accordance with the 
Principle of Generic Consistency (according to which all agents are required to act in 
accordance with the “generic rights”4 of all agents). Since Gewirth’s concept of an agent is 
equivalent to Kant’s idea of “a rational being with a will,” Gewirth establishes that the 
Principle of Generic Consistency has the status that Kant claimed was necessary for an 
imperative to be categorically binding: namely, that it be “connected (entirely a priori) with 
the concept of the will of a rational being as such” (Kant 1948, 62).5 The Principle of 
Generic Consistency is, therefore, established as the supreme principle, not only of morality, 
but of all practical reasoning. 
 To establish what may or may not be done, what ought or ought not to be done, is, quite 
simply, a matter of establishing what the Principle of Generic Consistency permits or 
requires in relation to agents. 
 This, however, is by no means an unproblematic task. The way in which Gewirth defines 
agency is to be viewed, not as a generalisation about the empirical characteristics of human 
beings or any other creatures in the world, but as a function of the characteristics that beings 
must be supposed to have if they are to be regarded, rationally, as subjects and objects of 
practical precepting. Agents are defined as they are in Gewirthian (and Kantian) theory, 
because it is only for beings with the capacity to direct their actions voluntarily towards 
purposes that they have chosen that questions arise about what practical precepts may or 
should be followed, and it is only to such beings that practical precepts can rationally be 
directed. However, while this feature renders the premise of Gewirth’s argument for the 
Principle of Generic Consistency immune from objections derived from empirical 
psychology, it opens the way to an objection of an altogether different kind. 
 As defined, being an agent involves having a kind of mental attitude (so that the 
capacities that make up being an agent are, in essential part, mental capacities). Thus, since I 
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1  This essay is derived in part from Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998. 
2 See Beyleveld 1991. 
3 An agent acts, i.e., voluntarily pursues its freely chosen purposes. A prospective agent has the capacity and 
disposition to act. We use “agent” to cover both agents and prospective agents. 
4 Generic rights are to the generic features of agency (those capacities an agent needs to be able to act at all or 
with any general chances of success, whatever its purposes might be). Interference with, or deprivation of, a 
generic feature of agency will interfere (or tend to interfere) with an agent’s capacity to act or to act 
successfully, regardless of what the action envisaged is. 
5 See Beyleveld 1999a for analysis of the relationship between Kant’s derivation of the Categorical Imperative 
and Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency. 
(any agent) have direct access to my mental state, I know that I am an agent directly. I do 
not, however, know that any other being is an agent in this way. The best I (any agent) can 
do, when trying to determine whether or not some other being “X” is an agent, is to 
construct a model of the characteristics and behavior to be expected of an agent, and test 
X’s characteristics and behavior against it. However, even if X exhibits all the characteristics 
and behavior expected of an agent (as most biologically human beings do) and is ostensibly 
an agent, this does not prove that X is an agent. It is possible that X is a programmed 
automaton without a mind, and no amount of empirical observation of X’s characteristics 
and behavior will be able to prove otherwise. The relevance of empirical evidence cited for 
X’s mental status depends on metaphysical assumptions. In short, the problem of knowing 
whether or not another being is an agent is a special case of the philosophical problem of 
other minds. 
 Thus, a sceptic might concede that Gewirth has, indeed, shown that the Principle of 
Generic Consistency is categorically binding upon agents, but then contend that this has no 
practical significance, because it cannot be demonstrated with the same degree of 
stringency (to the sceptic—any agent) that there are any other agents. In other words, the 
Principle of Generic Consistency has categorical application only in the abstract. In relation 
to objects in the empirical world, it provides no categorically binding criterion for moral 
action. 
 In this essay we will first of all respond to the sceptic. We will argue that the 
categorically binding nature of the Principle of Generic Consistency requires precautionary 
reasoning to be employed so as to make it a categorically binding requirement to regard all 
beings that behave as though they are agents as agents. 
 In Part II we will argue that this same reasoning requires agents to recognise duties to 
various “marginal” groups (such as young children, the mentally deficient, fetuses, and non-
human animals), in proportion to the degree to which there is evidence that they might 
possibly be agents. Gewirth himself has argued that such marginal groups have the generic 
rights in proportion to the extent to which they approach being agents (see Gewirth 1978, 
121-124; 140-145). However, instead of deriving such protection from the epistemic 
limitations of the Principle of Generic Consistency’s empirical application, Gewirth seeks to 
extend the population to which the principle grants protection in the abstract. In Part III, we 
argue that Gewirth’s attempt to do this fails. 
Part IV will focus on Gewirth’s analysis of the level of protection to be conferred on 
fetuses, thereby demonstrating that despite adopting a different rationale, our analysis grants 
a similar level of protection to marginal groups as Gewirth. 
 
I. Precaution and Ostensible Agents 
 
Given that the sceptic cannot coherently deny that he, she, or it (it)6 is an agent, there are a 
number of ways of responding to the sceptic who wishes to deny that the Principle of 
Generic Consistency has any categorically binding application. 
 First, this position is virtually impossible to sustain in practice. To sustain it, the sceptic 
must refrain from prescribing anything to any other being. It cannot impose duties on others, 
or think that there are any beings against whom it can claim the rights that it must, in the 
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abstract, claim for itself. Indeed, it cannot engage in any discourse of reasons with any being 
other than itself. 
 Second, while it might coherent to consider that there are no other agents, it would 
certainly be regarded as irrational to do so on the criteria that govern everyday life. To 
attempt to eschew the practical force of the supreme principle of morality by recourse to 
solipsistic assertions is still a very high price to pay. 
 Third, the sceptic’s objection does not place the Principle of Generic Consistency at any 
disadvantage compared with any other practical principle or moral theory, simply because 
the denial that there are other agents will affect any scheme of practical prescriptions equally. 
 However, it is possible to do much better than any of this! Everything that our sceptic 
wishes to assert may be conceded to the point of agreeing (even where X, on the basis of 
its characteristics and behavior, appears to be an agent) that the propositions “X is an agent” 
and “X is not an agent” are on a par with respect to an ability to demonstrate the truth of 
either. However, it needs to be appreciated that these propositions are not on a par 
morally. If I (any agent) mistakenly presume X to be an agent, then, although this will lead 
me (mistakenly) to have to restrict my exercise of my rights to some extent, I do not deny 
my (or any other agent’s) status as a rights-holder. But, if I mistakenly presume X not to be 
an agent, then I deny that X (an agent) is a rights-holder. 
 Thus, to presume that X is an agent runs no risk of violating the primary injunction of the 
Principle of Generic Consistency, whereas to presume that X is not an agent, runs this risk. 
But, given that the Principle of Generic Consistency is categorically binding, there can be no 
justification under any circumstances whatsoever for violating it. Thus, to risk the possibility 
of violating the Principle of Generic Consistency, when this can be avoided, is itself to 
violate the Principle. Therefore, it is itself categorically necessary to do whatever one can to 
avoid this consequence (provided, of course, that the actions taken do not conflict with 
more important requirements to be derived from the Principle of Generic Consistency). 
 Where X displays the characteristics and behavior expected of an agent, we might say 
that X is “ostensibly an agent” or an “ostensible agent.” When X is an ostensible agent, by 
the very nature of the case, it will be possible to treat X as an agent. In this case at least, it is 
possible to avoid the risk altogether of mistakenly denying that X is an agent, by presuming 
X to be an agent and acting accordingly. 
  Hence, it follows that agents are categorically required to accept, 
Where X is an ostensible agent, the metaphysical possibility that X might not be an agent, is 
to be wholly discounted, and X’s ostensible agency is to be taken as sufficient evidence that 
X has the capacities needed to be an agent. 
 Implicit in the reasoning to this conclusion, which constitutes a moral argument for the 
recognition of other minds,7 is the following Precautionary Principle. 
If there is no way of knowing whether or not X has property P, then, insofar as it is 
possible to do so, X must be assumed to have property P if the consequences (as 
measured by the Principle of Generic Consistency) of erring in presuming that X does 
not have P are worse than those of erring in presuming that X has P (and X must be 
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assumed to not have P if the consequences of erring in presuming that X has P are 
worse than those of assuming that X does not have P).8 
 
II. Proportional Duties to Apparent Partial Agents under Precautionary Reasoning 
 
It has been shown that where X exhibits the characteristics and behavior of an ostensible 
agent, I (any agent) am categorically required to treat that being as an agent. Suppose, 
however, that X exhibits (and, as far, as I am able to ascertain, only exhibits) capacities of 
agency to a degree less than an ostensible agent. In other words, suppose the evidence is 
sufficient to infer only that X is a partial agent—a being that has some of the characteristics 
needed to be an agent to at least some degree, without having sufficient of these to the 
degree needed to be an agent. In such a case, although X is apparently only a partial agent, 
precisely because the proposition that an other is an agent is a metaphysical one and 
human reason is limited in such matters, I cannot infer that X is not an agent. Just as I 
cannot know with certainty that an other being is an agent when that being is an ostensible 
agent, so I cannot know with certainty that X is not an agent when X is apparently only a 
partial agent. 
 So, even where an other being is apparently only a partial agent there remains a risk 
that—if I suppose that it is not an agent, and act accordingly—it is an agent, and I will have 
deprived it of the protection of the Principle of Generic Consistency to which it is entitled. 
Thus, it remains categorically required, all things being equal, to do whatever one can do to 
avoid this consequence—provided, as always, that my doing so does not violate more 
important provisions of the Principle of Generic Consistency. 
 However, where X is apparently only a partial agent, it is not possible to avoid this 
consequence altogether. I can, indeed, refrain from harming (and can assist) X in ways that 
would safeguard the benefits that it would receive if X had rights and chose to exercise 
them. I can, indeed, recognise duties not to harm (and to assist) X in various ways. 
However, it must not be forgotten [p44] that if X is, in fact, an agent, then the Principle of 
Generic Consistency requires X (thereby) to be accorded will claim-rights,9 the benefits of 
which it may waive. But, by not displaying ostensible agency, X fails to demonstrate (even 
under precautionary reasoning) that it has the capacities by virtue of which X is able to 
waive the benefits of what it is entitled to. Thus, the “duties of protection” that I must 
recognise that I have towards X, where X is apparently only a partial agent, are unavoidably 
paternalistic, which is at odds with what X is strictly entitled to qua agent (should X, in fact, 
be an agent). 
 Given that I am categorically required (under precautionary reasoning) to recognise 
duties of protection to X and Z (who are both apparently only partial agents), what am I 
required to do if these duties come into conflict? 
                                                 
8 Because of its link to the Principle of Generic Consistency, this principle is categorically binding. The 
reasoning behind dicta such as “Innocent unless proven guilty!” or “Give the benefit of the doubt” can be 
subsumed under this principle. Precautionary reasoning, as such, need not take the Principle of Generic 
Consistency as the yardstick by which to evaluate the consequences of error. 
9  Claim-rights are justified claims imposing correlative duties on others. There are two principal theories of 
claim-rights: the benefit (or interest) theory, and the will (or choice) theory. The difference between the 
benefit and will theory is that the latter requires the right -holder to have the capacity to waive the benefit of 
the right (i.e., be an agent). 
 All other things being equal, such conflicts are to be handled by a criterion of avoidance 
of more probable harm, according to which, 
If my doing y to Z is more likely to cause harm h to Z than my doing y to X (and I cannot 
avoid doing y to one of Z or X) then I ought to do y to X rather than to Z. 
 Where y = failing to observe a particular duty of protection, and h = mistakenly denying 
a being the status of an agent, we can infer by this criterion that, 
If my failing to observe a particular duty of protection to Z is more likely to mistakenly deny 
Z the status of an agent than is my failing to observe this duty of protection to X (and I 
cannot avoid failing to observe this duty to one of Z or X) then I ought to fail to observe my 
duty to X rather than to Z. 
 Since I am more likely to mistakenly deny that a being is an agent the more probable it is 
that the being is an agent, it follows that my duties of protection to those who are more 
probably agents take precedence over my duties of protection to those who are less 
probably agents. 
 The moral status of a being may be measured by the weight to be given to the duties of 
protection owed to it by an agent. In such terms, it follows that the moral status of beings 
who are more probably agents is greater than that of beings who are less probably agents. 
In other words, the moral status of beings is proportional to the probability that they are 
agents. 
 Given that X’s display of the capacities of agency must (under precautionary reasoning 
guided by the Principle of Generic Consistency) be viewed as sufficient evidence that X is an 
agent, it follows that if X displays characteristics and behavior to a degree less than that of 
an ostensible agent then this must be viewed as less than sufficient evidence (but evidence 
nonetheless) that X is an agent. In other words, where X is an ostensible agent, the 
probability that X is an agent must be taken to be 1, and where X is apparently only a partial 
agent, the probability that X is an agent must be taken to be 0 but 1 in proportion to the 
capacities of agency that X displays. 
 Thus, we establish that apparent partial agents are owed duties of protection by agents 
in proportion to the degree to which they approach being ostensible agents—not qua their 
being partial agents—but qua their possibly being agents.10 
 
III. Gewirth’s Use of the Principle of Proportionality to Derive Generic Rights for 
Marginal Groups 
 
Gewirth also maintains the Principle of Generic Consistency grants proportional protection 
to various marginal groups, such as young children, the mentally deficient, fetuses, and non-
human animals (see Gewirth, 1978, 121-124; 140-145). However, Gewirth’s reasoning for 
this conclusion differs significantly from our own. Instead of deriving such protection from 
the epistemic limitations of the Principle of Generic Consistency’s empirical application, 
Gewirth maintains that the protection granted by the Principle of Generic Consistency’s 
ontology is not confined to agents. Gewirth claims that the “Principle of Proportionality” 
                                                 
10 We do not mean to suggest that the Principle of Generic Consistency requires agents to do everything they 
possibly can to cater for the possibility that apparently only a partial agent is an agent, as all things are often 
not equal. Analysis of the relative weight of costs derivable from the Principle of Generic Consistency must 
be left for consideration in future works. For a brief exploration of some of the complexities involved, see 
Beyleveld 1999b. 
operates to extend the population to which the Principle of Generic Consistency applies in 
the abstract.  
Gewirth states the Principle of Proportionality as follows. 
 
“When some quality Q justifies having certain rights R, and the possession of Q varies in 
degree in the respect that is relevant to Q’s justifying the having of R, the degree to 
which R is had is proportional to or varies with the degree to which Q is had. Thus, if x 
units of Q justify that one have x units of R, then y units of Q justify that one have y units 
of R.” (Gewirth 1978, 121) 
 
 At an intermediate step in his argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency, 
Gewirth shows that agents must (on pain of denying that they are agents) consider their 
being agents as the sufficient condition for their possession of all of the generic rights (see 
Gewirth 1978, 10). Consequently, agents deny that they are agents if they do not grant the 
generic rights equally to all other agents. Thus, the claim that the Principle of Generic 
Consistency requires agents to grant the generic rights in part to partial agents, is to be 
validated by substituting “being an agent” for Q and “the generic rights” for R in the Principle 
of Proportionality. In other words, Gewirth wishes to use the Principle of Proportionality in 
combination with the Principle of Generic Consistency to infer that as one approaches 
agency, one is accorded proportionally greater generic rights. 
According to James F. Hill (1984, 182), 
 
“The agent will hold the Principle of Proportionality presumably on the grounds that it is 
rational to do so and, in addition, because of the central role it has played in the 
traditional doctrines of distributive justice.” 
 
 However, such grounds are too weak if the Principle of Proportionality is to be used to 
extend the subjects of protection of a categorically binding principle. Gewirth himself (1978, 
121) claims, not merely that the Principle of Proportionality “is a pervasive feature of 
traditional doctrines of distributive justice,” but that it is true and, since Gewirth claims that 
agents are categorically required to grant the generic rights in part to partial agents, he must 
be claiming that it is necessarily true. 
 However, while it is necessarily true that, when having Q justifies having R, and the 
possession of Q varies in degree in the respect that is relevant to having Q’s justifying the 
having of R, the degree to which R is had is a function of the degree to which Q is had, it 
cannot be inferred (without further conditions being imposed) that having R is such a 
function of having Q that, if having x units of Q justify that one have x units of R, then having 
y units of Q justify that one have y units of R for all values of x and y. 
 It is also preferable to make explicit the conditions that must be satisfied for possession 
of Q to vary in degree in the respect that is relevant to having Q justify having R. Thus, with 
it being understood that R can be any property at all, the Principle of Proportionality should 
be stated as, 
When having some quality Q justifies having some property R, and the extent of having Q 
sufficient to justify having R in full is not necessary to justify having R to any extent at all, the 
degree to which R is had is a function of the degree to which Q is had. 
 As we stated above, in the process of arguing for the Principle of Generic Consistency 
Gewirth shows that being an agent (defined as having purposes that it acts11 for) is necessary 
and sufficient for having the generic rights in full (see Gewirth 1978, 10). While having 
purposes that one acts for is an invariant relational property, to have this relational property 
it is necessary to have particular capacities and properties.12 While agents have these 
capacities to the degree needed to have this relational property, partial agents (by definition) 
have the capacities required to be an agent to a lesser extent. Gewirth claims that the 
Principle of Proportionality shows that the degree to which partial agents have the generic 
rights depends upon the degree to which they have the capacities required to be an agent. 
 This cannot be true, because having the capacities required to be an agent to the degree 
needed to be an agent is not only necessary (and sufficient) to have the generic rights in full 
(so that agents with these capacities to degrees greater than that needed to be an agent 
cannot, thereby, acquire the generic rights to a greater extent), it is necessary to have any 
generic rights at all. This is because, as derived, the generic rights are will claim-rights; i.e., 
those who have them can always, by their free choice, waive the benefits that exercise of the 
generic rights entitles them to—provided only that they do not, thereby, neglect or violate 
their duties to other agents. This is not a function of an arbitrary espousal of the will theory of 
rights. It derives from the fact that, in the argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency, 
agents are required to claim the generic rights for themselves, not because they are required 
to value the generic features of agency for their own sakes, but as instrumental to their 
pursuit or achievement of their purposes whatever these might be. But, in order to be able to 
freely waive the benefits of a right, one must have all the capacities needed to be an agent. 
Thus, partial agents cannot have any generic rights. 
 This objection cannot be evaded by acknowledging that partial agents cannot have any 
generic rights strictly speaking, and claiming, instead, that the Principle of Proportionality 
nonetheless shows that partial agents have “quasi-generic rights” (unwaivable protections 
correlative to duties of agents not to harm partial agents, or to assist them in need) in 
proportion to their approach to being agents. The Principle of Proportionality can only 
license inferences about the quantity of predication of a quality, it cannot (by itself) license 
inferences that alter the quality of what is predicated. To have a quasi-generic right is not to 
have a generic right to some extent. It is to have a different quality of protection from that 
granted by a generic right. 
 
IV. Applying Precautionary Reasoning to the Human Fetus13  
 
In Reason and Morality Gewirth seeks to apply his Principle of Proportionality (together 
with the Principle of Generic Consistency) to the human fetus (see Gewirth 1978, especially 
142-143). Gewirth claims that together these principles establish, 
 
                                                 
11  See footnote 3. 
12  Gewirth, himself, refers to the capacities and propert ies required to be an agent (to have this relational 
property) as the “practical abilities of the generic features of action” (Gewirth 1978, 122). 
13 For a broader picture of the moral status of the human embryo and fetus incorporating the arguments of this  
paper, see Beyleveld 1999b. For an earlier analysis, see Beyleveld 1998. 
(a) The fetus has generic rights, which do not include a generic right to freedom,14 but are 
restricted to rights to the conditions (“well-being”) necessary to fulfil its potential to 
develop into an agent (the chief of which conditions is its life). 
 
(b) The fetus’ generic rights 
(i) are overridden in case of conflict with the generic rights of its mother; 
(ii) are not merely of lesser weight than those of its mother, but minimal in comparison—
because the fetus has the capacities required to be an agent in “remotely potential form” 
only and lacks purposivity altogether;15 and 
(iii) increase in weight with the length of gestation, because the greater the length of gestation 
the closer the fetus approaches having the degree of the capacities required to be an 
agent that an agent has.16 
 
 Applying the Principle of Proportionality under precautionary reasoning requires agents 
to accept duties of protection towards the fetus insofar as, and to the degree that, the fetus 
approaches being an ostensible agent (on the grounds that the closer the fetus approaches to 
being an ostensible agent the more likely it is to be an agent). Assuming that the fetus’ 
mother is an ostensible agent, she must be taken to be an agent.17 On the evidence that 
precautionary reasoning requires us to accept, it is (very much) less likely that the fetus (at 
any stage of its development) is an agent than that its mother is. Hence, greater moral status 
must be granted to the mother than to the fetus: duties to the mother (which must be taken to 
be correlative to her rights) will outweigh any duties in relation to the fetus in case of conflict. 
Apart from the fact that we cannot agree with Gewirth’s claim that the duties of protection 
towards the fetus derive from the fetus’ generic rights, we can agree with (b)(ii). 
 With this caveat, using the Principle of Proportionality under precautionary reasoning, 
requires us to agree with (b)(iii) as well. In principle, the longer the gestation of the fetus, the 
more the agency-related characteristics and behavior it will display (by virtue of which it will 
get closer to being an ostensible agent), and this means that we must progressively take 
seriously the possibility that it might be an agent after all, in consequence of which we must 
treat it with greater precaution (and, hence, greater respect). 
 Gewirth appears to say that the Principle of Proportionality and the Principle of Generic 
Consistency justify that the fetus has a right to realise its potential to develop into an agent—
                                                 
14 Presumably because, not being an agent, the fetus lacks freedom (the capacity to make choices) altogether, and 
“ ‘may act’ implies ‘can act.’ ” 
15
 Evelyn Pluhar maintains that Gewirth’s claim that fetuses do not have primitive purposes or memories has 
“been called into question quite successfully by neurophysiologists and cognitive psychologists” (1995, 252). 
She cites empirical research that has been interpreted to show that “neural pathways sufficient for pain 
perception are present well before birth” and asks rhetorically, 
 Does Gewirth suppose that aversion to pain or unpleasant sensations also springs ex nihilo upon the point of 
birth? (ibid.) 
  However, while Gewirth’s description of the capacities of the fetus may well be inaccurate, this has no 
bearing on the principles of application involved in Gewirth’s analysis. 
16 Gewirth often writes as though “approaching having the capacities required to be an agent” and “having the 
capacities required to be an agent in part are interchangeable.” They are if “approaching having the capacities 
required to be an agent” is always read as “approaching having the capacities required to be an agent in full.” 
17 And even if she does not display this degree of agency-related characteristics and behavior, she is bound to 
display more of these than the fetus—at any stage of its development. 
from which it may be inferred that the fetus has a right to life and the other conditions 
necessary to realise its potential to develop into an agent. 
 If so, then we need an explanation of how the Principle of Proportionality can effect the 
inference from 
 
(A)  “X is an agent with the generic rights” 
to 
(B)  “Y (a partial agent with the potential to develop into an agent) has a right to develop 
into an agent.” 
 
 We do not know what Gewirth has in mind. However, agents must be granted additive 
rights—rights to development of their potential (capacities) for action (understood as rights 
to increase their competence as agents). Since increasing an agent’s competence as an agent 
involves increasing the degree of capacities it has beyond the degree required to be an 
agent, agents’ additive rights are essentially rights to increase the degree of the capacities 
they have. Perhaps, Gewirth reasons that fetuses (as partial agents) must, by the Principle of 
Proportionality, be granted these same rights to development of the degree of the capacities 
they possess in proportion to the degree of these capacities they already have. Since the 
fetus (as a partial agent) cannot yet act, development of its capacity to act can only mean its 
development into an agent; and, thus, its right to develop its capacity to act will be a right to 
develop into an agent. 
 Implicit in the claim that the fetus has a right to develop into an agent is the claim that a 
partial agent with the potential to be an agent has a right to develop into an agent. So, if the 
reasoning we have suggested for Gewirth is valid, then an important conclusion follows: viz., 
A partial agent that is a potential agent has a right to life (and other conditions of its being 
able to develop into an agent) in proportion to the degree to which its potential is realised 
(i.e., to the degree to which it approaches being an agent). 
 However, if this is Gewirth’s reasoning, then it is unsound. The fetus (as a potential 
agent) is still no more than a partial agent, and cannot have any generic rights. So the 
Principle of Proportionality cannot show that it has the generic rights to develop its potential 
to act in proportion to the degree of the capacities required to be an agent that it has. 
Development of this capacity for action up to the level needed to be able to exercise rights is 
not commensurable with development of this capacity beyond this level. 
 What if we look at the matter under precautionary reasoning? Under such reasoning, the 
fetus is to be viewed as a possible agent that does not exhibit the capacities required to be 
an agent to the degree that requires us to accept that it is an agent. So viewed, if the fetus is 
an agent, then its failure to display the characteristics and behavior of an ostensible agent is 
not because it is not an agent; it is because something is preventing it from displaying the 
[p50] qualifying characteristics and behavior (or from displaying it in ways that we can 
interpret properly).18  
 So, if the fetus is, despite apparently being only a partial agent, an agent, then the proper 
story to tell is not that, as it approaches being an ostensible agent, its potential to be an agent 
                                                 
18 Thus, one way of explaining why we are required to take more seriously the possibility that a fetus is an agent 
the closer it approaches to being an ostensible agent, is that the more the agency -related characteristics and 
behavior it displays the less elaborate and fanciful are the metaphysical stories we have to tell to explain why, 
despite being an agent, it is unable to display the expected characteristics and behavior. 
is being realised, but that as it approaches being an ostensible agent, its potential to express 
itself as an agent is being realised. Suppose, then, that the fetus is an agent. From this it 
follows that the fetus does have the generic rights. 
 Of course, because the fetus is apparently only a partial agent, we cannot treat it as 
having such rights. But we can protect it as an agent, by accepting the duty to allow the 
fetus’ potential to display the capacities required to be an agent to develop (and to assist this 
development, when necessary). Furthermore, this duty will be subject to proportionality 
reasoning, because the more the fetus displays as these sort of characteristics and behavior 
develop (to the point of being an ostensible agent) the more seriously we must take the 
possibility that it is an agent. 
However, we cannot conclude from this that we have a duty to protect the life of a 
potential agent as such (and other conditions of its being able to develop into an agent) in 
proportion to the degree to which it approaches being an agent; for, the potential that is the 
basis of our duty to protect the fetus’ development of the capacities (required to be an 
agent) is not the potential of the fetus to be an agent, but the potential of a possible agent 
unable to display these capacities to develop the ability to do so. 
We have already argued that, under precautionary reasoning, agents have a duty to 
allow the fetus’ potential to display the capacities needed to be an agent to develop (and to 
assist this development, when necessary), and that this duty is subject to proportionality 
reasoning. However, because evidence that a fetus or embryo (X) is a potential ostensible 
agent is evidence relevant to the probability that X is an agent, precautionary reasoning also 
supports the following claims. 
 
(1) Evidence that X is a potential ostensible agent, by itself, requires agents to grant X moral 
status (in proportion to the strength of the evidence); and 
(2) Evidence that X is a potential ostensible agent adds to the moral status secured for X by 
the degree to which X exhibits the characteristics and behavior associated with 
possession of the capacities required to be an agent. Thus, if Y is apparently only a 
partial agent with y moral status (by virtue of Y’s degree of the [p51] generic capacity 
for action) but not apparently a potential ostensible agent, and X is apparently a partial 
agent with y moral status and also apparently a potential ostensible agent, then agents 
must take more seriously the possibility that X is an agent than that Y is an agent, by 
virtue of which their duties of protection to X are greater than their similar duties to Y. 
(And, of course, the degree to which evidence of potential to become an agent adds to 
X’s moral status will be proportional to the strength of this evidence.) 
  
The weakest evidence that one can have that X is a potential ostensible agent is that X is 
a member of a species S (some of) whose members are known to develop into ostensible 
agents under specified conditions.19 To this can be added knowledge of specific 
characteristics that X has and of correlations between possession of these and development 
into ostensible agents by members of S. All factors of this kind being equal, the further X 
develops in the direction of becoming an ostensible agent, the more confident one can be 
that X will develop the whole way. Thus, considerations of evidence for potential and 
                                                 
19 Complications, which we will not address here, are created by the fact that these conditions can be specified 
differently. Thus, the concept of potentiality, like that of a cause (vs. background conditions), is to a degree 
normative in being dependent on what is taken to be “normal.” 
considerations of evidence of degree of approach to being an agent will not be wholly 
independent. The precise interactions, however, cannot be stated without a detailed analysis, 
which must be left for another occasion. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In the final analysis, despite the fact that he couches this in terms of the having of generic 
rights, the thesis that Gewirth wants to defend is that various categories of creature that do 
not display all the necessary characteristics of agents, are necessarily accorded moral status 
by the Principle of Generic Consistency in proportion to the degree to which they approach 
being ostensible agents. We have argued that this thesis is true. 
 However, Gewirth’s attempt to demonstrate this thesis takes the form of claiming that 
the Principle of Proportionality grants the generic rights in part to partial agents, in 
proportion to the degree to which they approach being agents. In so doing, Gewirth is 
modifying what the Principle of Generic Consistency says. If he is right, then this principle 
itself should state not just that agents must grant the generic rights equally to all agents, but 
that agents must grant the generic rights to all beings in proportion to their approach to being 
agents. This claim affects the ontology of Gewirth’s moral theory; the population of the 
principle’s beneficiaries in the abstract terms in which the categorically binding argument is 
couched. Gewirth’s application of the Principle of Proportionality to the Principle of Generic 
Consistency is part of his argument to the principle itself, rather than an application of the 
principle to objects in the empirical world. 
 We have argued that this attempt must fail. Gewirth cannot be right about this without 
implying propositions that contradict the possible validity of his argument for the Principle of 
Generic Consistency.  
 Our own argument does not attempt to extend the principle’s ontology, which remains 
restricted to the population of agents. It is not presented as part of the derivation of the 
principle at all. It is grounded in an argument about the process that must be gone through to 
apply the Principle of Generic Consistency to objects in the empirical world. It takes as its 
basis the fact that application of the Principle of Generic Consistency requires judgments 
concerning which objects in the world are agents. The key to this argument is the claim that 
considerations of precaution render agents categorically bound to accept that beings 
displaying the characteristics and behavior expected of an agent are to be taken to be agents 
even though it cannot be proven that this is so. The same considerations of precaution, 
however, render it illegitimate to entirely discount the possibility that a being displaying any 
of the necessary characteristics of an agent might be an agent. How seriously this possibility 
must be taken is, however, proportional to how much evidence we have that the being is an 
agent (which will depend on how much of the behavior sufficient—under precautionary 
reasoning—to render it necessary to judge that a being is an agent the being displays). 
 Thus, under precautionary reasoning, proportionality reasoning requires that beings that 
are apparently only partial agents be granted moral status in proportion to how closely they 
approach being ostensible agents. Consequently, although our analysis and Gewirth’s own 
are very different theoretically, the practical implications of these analyses (accurately 
performed) should not be very different. 
 Thus, in practice, we can say that we have shown that agents owe duties of protection 
to partial agents in proportion to their approach to being agents. If we do this, however, it 
must not be forgotten that this is only a shorthand, and that the duties are actually owed to 
beings that are apparently only partial agents on the basis of their possible status as agents, 
by virtue of which they are owed not in proportion to the degree of approach to being an 
agent but in proportion to the degree to which what is apparently only a partial agent 
approaches being an ostensible agent.20 
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